Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.
攻撃者は、ユーザへ送信されるMFAリクエストを生成することで、多要素認証（MFA）機構を回避し、アカウントへのアクセスを試みることがあります。
Adversaries in possession credentials to Valid Accounts may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA
mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such
as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account.
攻撃者が有効なアカウントの認証情報を所持していても、追加の認証情報およびセキュリティ制御として必要な 2FA または MFA にアクセスできなければ、ログインプロセスを完了できない可能性があります。これを回避するために、攻撃者は Duo Push、Microsoft Authenticator、Okta などの MFA
サービスへのプッシュ通知の自動生成を悪用して、ユーザーに自分のアカウントへのアクセスを許可させることがあります。
In some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to "MFA fatigue."[1][2][3]
場合によっては、攻撃者は、MFAのプッシュ通知、SMSメッセージ、および電話をユーザーに浴びせかけるために、ログイン試行を継続的に繰り返し、「MFA疲れ」に応じてユーザーが最終的に認証要求を受け入れる結果になる可能性があります。
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0016 | APT29 |
APT29 has used repeated MFA requests to gain access to victim accounts.[3] |
| G1004 | LAPSUS$ |
LAPSUS$ has spammed target users with MFA prompts in the hope that the legitimate user will grant necessary approval.[4] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1036 | Account Use Policies |
Enable account restrictions to prevent login attempts, and the subsequent 2FA/MFA service requests, from being initiated from suspicious locations or when the source of the login attempts do not match the location of the 2FA/MFA smart device. |
| M1032 | Multi-factor Authentication |
Implement more secure 2FA/MFA mechanisms in replacement of simple push or one-click 2FA/MFA options. For example, having users enter a one-time code provided by the login screen into the 2FA/MFA application or utilizing other out-of-band 2FA/MFA mechanisms (such as rotating code-based hardware tokens providing rotating codes that need an accompanying user pin) may be more secure. Furthermore, change default configurations and implement limits upon the maximum number of 2FA/MFA request prompts that can be sent to users in period of time.[2] |
| M1017 | User Training |
Train users to only accept 2FA/MFA requests from login attempts they initiated, to review source location of the login attempt prompting the 2FA/MFA requests, and to report suspicious/unsolicited prompts. |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0015 | Application Log | Application Log Content |
Monitor application logs for suspicious events including repeated MFA failures that may indicate user's primary credentials have been compromised. |
| DS0028 | Logon Session | Logon Session Creation |
Monitor 2FA/MFA application logs for suspicious events such as rapid login attempts with valid credentials. |
| Logon Session Metadata |
Monitor 2FA/MFA application logs for suspicious events such as unusual login attempt source location, mismatch in location of login attempt and smart device approving 2FA/MFA
request prompts. |
||
| DS0002 | User Account | User Account Authentication |
Monitor user account logs for suspicious events: unusual login attempt source location, mismatch in location of login attempt and smart device receiving 2FA/MFA request
prompts, and high volume of repeated login attempts, all of which may indicate user's primary credentials have been compromised minus 2FA/MFA mechanism. |